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1Abstract
In this paper we build a two-tiered agency model of a …nancial …rm that
incorporates rent-seeking behavior from division managers, risk aversion from
outside investors in a context of incomplete market and imperfect competition.
We …nd no evidence for any socialism inside internal capital markets. Indeed
we establish that divisions with better investment opportunities and high risk
levels are allocated more capital relatively to other divisions. Divisions with
poor investment opportunities and low risk level are allocated more cash wage
budget. We also establish a positive correlation between the size of the division
and its risk level. This result suggests that large banks are more risky than small
ones. This conclusion is in accordance with the idea claimed by many authors,
that the wave of merger and acquisitions in the banking industry increases the
systemic risk inside the …nancial system.
Key Words: Internal capital markets, Capital Budgeting, …nancial institu-
tions
JEL Classi…cation : G31, G34, G20
21 INTRODUCTION
Over the last twenty years, many …nance observers (academics and practitioners)
agreed that diversi…ed …rms were priced down by the markets relatively to
focused …rms. This idea …nds a strong support in the literature. Indeed many
papers provided an empirical evidence that diversi…cation can destroy value. In
particular Daley, Mehorta and Sivakumar (1997) and John and Ofek (1995),
showed that shareholders gain, when …rms become more focused by divesting
unrelated segments. Others like Jarrell (1995) claimed that …rms are priced
abnormally high over the focusing period.
While authors agree over the idea that corporate diversi…cation is value re-
ducing, the reasons for that di¤ers from one author to another and a wide
range of explanations has been given in the literature. According to Scharfstein
and Stein (2000) the conglomerate form of organization leads to investment in-
e¢ciencies that arise from managerial agency problems, while Jensen (1993),
showed that in conglomerates, more resources are allocated to managers which
could lead to over-investment. This could occur for instance, if the conglomer-
ates borrow more against their assets than a comparable portfolio of specialized
…rms. While such an argument could hold in theory, Berger and Ofek (1995)
established that in practice this extra borrowing e¤ect is of trivial importance
and thus, cannot explain investment ine¢ciencies that occur in conglomerate
organizations.
Another alternative for explaining these ine¢ciencies inside diversi…ed …rms,
is that their internal capital markets are in some ways ine¢cient. In other
terms, they allocate too much in some divisions and too little in others. While
this fact is observed in practice1, it is far from obvious that such reallocation
leads systematically to ine¢cient investment. It seems then clear that the main
1see Shin and Stulz (1997)
3question here will be the following: Does the resource reallocation process inside
a diversi…ed …rm lead systematically to ine¢cient investment, if so why?
According to the available literature, there is no unique answer to that ques-
tion. Indeed, Stein (1997) noticed that the reallocation process of resources
most of the time leads to higher e¢ciency if the CEO is deriving private bene-
…ts from control. This happens because the CEO’s ability to appropriate private
bene…ts should ultimately be roughly in line with the value of the enterprise as
a whole. Others like Shleifer and Vishny (1989) claim that the CEO will prefer
to invest in industries where they have more personal experience in order to
make themselves more valuable for the …rm. If the ”bad” projects provide rel-
atively high private bene…ts to the CEO, such investment decisions could lead
to ine¢ciencies inside the internal capital market.
In the same time, many authors considered these arguments as a simplistic
way to explain investment ine¢ciencies that occur inside conglomerates. Indeed
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) claimed the existence of a socialist nature inside
internal capital markets. In other terms weaker divisions are allocated too much
resources relatively to stronger ones. Since such a socialist pattern cannot be
rationalized simply by appealing to agency problems at the CEO level, they
developed a two-tiered agency model, in which they consider also the incentives
and the behavior of the division manager. They considered that by engaging in
rent-seeking activities2, the division manager extracts greater overall compensa-
tion from the CEO. This extra compensation could take the form of preferential
capital budgeting allocation rather than cash wage.
Despite the consistency of their results3, two major criticisms should be
2Rent-seeking activitiy could be considered as a non productive activity to the …rm, while
it increases the bargaining power of the division manager in the future when he negociates his
compensation package with the CEO.
3For empirical evidence see Zingales and Rajan (1997) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales
4made. In their model, they consider the capital as a given parameter without
any form of costs. This means that its allocation will not be subject to any
cost constraint, which is quite restrictive from our point view. Secondly, they
did not give an explicit de…nition of the production function, which is also
very restrictive since they de…ne they the private bene…ts as a portion of the
…rm’s production. Finally all their analysis has been made in a context of
risk-neutrality, complete markets and perfect competition, then we could ask
ourselves if the same results hold when the analysis is made in a context of
risk-aversion, incomplete markets and imperfect competition? This is basically
what we will try to do in this paper.
Empirically, a number of recent papers,claimed the thesis that diversi…cation
leads to lower …rm value: for instance Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) show
that during 1980s, diversifying acquisitions decrease shareholder wealth. Others
like Lang and Stulz (1994) provide evidence that the q measure of diversi…ed
…rms was signi…cantly smaller than the q of matching portfolios of specialized
…rms. In the same time some theoretical papers argue that e¢cient internal
capital market leads to higher value for shareholders. For instance Fluck and
leach (1996) established that agency costs prevent the …nancing of some positive
net present value projects by stand-alone …rms, but not within diversi…ed …rms.
Despite the existence of a relatively strong arguments from both sides, it is
important to put every analysis in its context, in particular many papers exclude
from their set of data the banking industry. For instance Lamont and Polk
(1999) as well as Berger and Ofek (1995) discarded …rms with segments in the
…nancial services industry. It seems then too risky to generalize their results to
all industries.
(1998)
5In fact if we look at the banking literature, such as Berger and Udell (1995),
Peek and Rosenberg (1996) and Berger and Udell (1996), we see that …nancial
conglomerates seems to allocate their resources in a non-socialist way. For
instance, Keeton (1996) and Santos (1997) showed that the wave of merger and
acquisitions in the banking industry tends to reduce small business lending.
This means that in …nancial conglomerates internal capital markets allocates
more resources to divisions with high investment opportunities. Consequently
we could ask ourselves if all the theoretical results (i.e., Scharfstein and Stein
(2000) established for …rms in general hold if the …rm is a bank. In this paper
we give one answer to this question and we try to see if internal capital market
are e¢cient or not.
Before going further with the development it is necessary to agree on the def-
inition of an e¢cient internal capital market. While any de…nition will depend
on the variables considered, particularly when we deal with agency issues, we
will refer in this paper to the de…nition given by Shin and Stulz (1997). These
authors claim that internal capital market is e¢cient if : its allocation of funds
to a segment falls when other segments have better investment opportunities,
second it gives priority in the allocation of funds to the segment with the best
investment opportunities; third it makes the investment of that segment less
sensitive to its own cash ‡ow as well as to the cash ‡ow of the other segment.
The primary objective of this paper is to develop a two-tiered agency model,
similar to the model of Scharfstein and Stein (1998), which explains how capital
is allocated inside a …nancial …rm, when we are in a context of incomplete
markets, risk-aversion and imperfect competition. We analyze the impact of
manager’s behavior on the resource allocation process and sees if this behavior
leads to ine¢ciencies inside internal capital markets. While this model is built
inside a …nancial …rm it has however a strong implications in the context of the
global …nancial system. In particular, it shows the motivation of the wave of
6mergers and acquisitions observed recently in the banking industry.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 speci…es the di¤erent variables
used in the model and discuss the robustness of the hypotheses set. Section 3
analyzes the model. Section 4 discusses empirical implications of the model and
extends the results to the global …nancial system. Section 5 concludes.
2 THE MODEL
2.1 De…nitions
We consider …nancial institution (i.e.: bank) with two divisions. While such a
case is quite unrealistic, it is however easier to manipulate. In the last section
of this paper we will show that our results are independent from the number of
divisions, as long as it is more than one division. The …rst division is involved
in deposit-…nanced credit and …nancing activity. More explicitly, it collects
deposits from clients and use them to invest whether in portfolios of debt by
granting loans and credit facilities or in a portfolio of equity by buying some
capital shares issued by companies. This activity generates a cash ‡ow which
is a function of the productivity of the division and the risk level chosen. This
return is usually higher than the interest paid by the bank on its deposits. The
cash ‡ows are fully and costlessly veri…able.
We denote by:
¼i the expected net cash ‡ows of division i generated by one unit of capital
invested. i=1,2
µi the productivity of division i i=1,2
¾i the risk level of division i4. i=1,2
4Due to the complexity of determining an appropriate risk measure, we don’t give any
7The expected net cash ‡ow is equal to the return received by the bank minus
the cost of deposits and all the operating expenses. We de…ne the cash-‡ow as
a function of the risk level and the productivity. We also assume that the net
cash ‡ow is always positive.
¼i = ¼ (¾i;µi) (1)
Usually the bank invests its resources whether in a portfolio of debt or eq-
uity. In Appendix A, we show that the cash-‡ow per one unit of capital is an









The second division is involved in self-…nancing derivatives trading. This
consists of taking zero net investment positions in derivatives such as forwards
and futures. This activity generates also a cash ‡ow, which has the same char-
acteristics as in (2) and (3).
Bankers are assumed to prefer higher expected return to lower expected
return for a given risk level. We de…ne the concept of productivity as the ability
to generate cash-‡ow for a given level of risk. This means that higher productive
divisions are supposed to generate more cash ‡ow per unit of capital than lower
productive divisions for the same risk level. Said di¤erently higher productivity
makes risk more productive and so managers of higher productive divisions
have more incentives to take risk than their colleagues of the low productive
details concerning the way how this risk is computed. In the litterature there are various
methods for measuring the risk such as value at risk (VAR).





Here we measure the productivity by the net cash-‡ow per unit of capital
however we don’t consider the cost of capital since in our case this cost -as we
will see later- could di¤er for two divisions with the same risk level but with
di¤erent sizes.
2.2 Cost of Capital
As we said previously, banks pay interest on most of their deposits and on
their debt capital (i.e., notes and debentures). What do they have to pay for
equity capital? The return that shareholders expect to earn on their investment
represents the implicit cost of equity capital. In the following we will refer by the
cost of capital, to the dividend yield required by outside investors (shareholders)
and paid by the …rm. This cost depends on the level of risk chosen by the …rm.
Note that the risk level of the …rm is entirely and instantaneously observable
by the shareholders. this means that any change in the risk level of the …rm
is immediately re‡ected in the cost of capital required by shareholders. We
denote by Ci the cost of one unit of capital raised by the …nancial institution
and allocated to division i.
As we stated in the introduction, our analysis is in a context of incom-
plete markets and imperfect competition. Complete market has been de…ned
5This is assumption is similar to the sorting condition introduced by Spence(1973) and
Mirlees (1971) except that here we are not in a case of asymetric information than we could
not talk about sorting condition.
9by Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) as a market where a …rm issues a debt and this
security does not alter the space of returns available in the securities market.
The same authors de…ne competition as follows:“ competition means that each
investor believes that if the output of any …rm increases by x % in each and
every state of nature, then the value of the …rm increases by x %”. Diamond
(1967) states that if, for example, the …rm is considering doubling its input
(investment), this would be calculated as doubling the value of input payments
(cost of investment), since the …rm acts as a price taker
The latter statement means that in a perfect competition context the cost
of an investment is independent of its size. Said di¤erently, the cost of one unit
of capital will be the same, for two projects with the same risk and di¤erent
sizes. According to Krouse (1978) this also means that investment decision of
the …rm does not a¤ect the implicit prices of individual investors6. Rubinstein
(1978) claimed that in a context of imperfect competition, any change in the
investment level of the …rm will be translated by a change in the investor’s
implicit prices. In the context of a certainty model he argues that even though
an individual …rm may have a slight e¤ect on the interest rate ( the inverse of
the sum of implicit prices), the consumption e¤ect that the change in interest
rate generates ” may dominate the …rm’s impact on the value of its own shares
(which comprise a small portion of the consumer’s portfolio). In our model this
means that the cost of capital ( the dividend yield required the shareholders)
will depend on the size of the project and so on the level of capital provided7.
Consequently we will have :
6Implicit prices are de…ned as the marginal rate of substitution of a unit of a return to be
received at time one, for a unit of return to be received at time zero.
7Rubinstein argues in addition that assuming that …rms are ” small relative to the rest
of the economy” is not su¢cient to justify the assumption that implicit prices will not be
a¤ected by the …rm’s investment level.
10Ci = C (¾i;ki) (6)
where ki is the amount of capital raised by the …rm and allocated to division
i and ¾i the risk level of division i.
According to Levy and Markowitz (1979) and using the mean variance frame-
work, we establish that the cost of capital is an increasing convex function of
the risk level. This convexity is given by the assumption that outside investors
are risk averse. Therefore we have
@Ci
@¾i





Intuitively, we could think that the cost of capital is an increasing function
of the amount of capital invested. This because outside investors will evaluate
any investment opportunity by using their implicit prices. If we start from a
situation of equilibrium where investors set their investment allocation based
on their implicit prices and the dividend yield o¤ered8. If the …rm decide to
raise more capital unless it gives higher dividend yield, investors will not move
from their initial optimum. Therefore for higher requested capital they should
be given higher return otherwise they will not invest. Of course if the cost of
capital increases inde…nitely, there exists a hurdle rate above which the …rm will
prefer to not invest otherwise the project’s value will be negative. Consequently
we expect to see the cost of capital as an increasing concave function of the
amount of capital invested. Here we will consider without any loss of generality
8An equilibrium in an economy involves both an equilibrium in the securities market cor-
ressponding to an investment allocation across …rms and an equilibrium with respect to the
allocation of investor’s (consummer) endowements between present consumption and invest-
ment. At equilibrium, the interest rate is equal to the inverse of the sum of implicit prices.
11that the amount of capital requested is not enough high to reach the level at
which the cost of capital is equal to the hurdle rate9. Then we have:
@Ci
@ki






We assume that division managers derive private bene…ts from the performance
of their divisions only, while the CEO derives private bene…ts from both divi-
sions10. These private bene…ts are non contractible and they represent a small
portion of the value of each division11:




[¼ (¾i;µi) - C (¾i;ki) ] For the CEO (11)
These private bene…ts could take the form of high hotel bills, trips on the
…rm’s private jet... etc.
We assume that the CEO has the authority of allocating capital as well
as hiring, retaining and setting the compensations of division managers. This
9We need this assumption to assure the monotonicity of the function and easier computa-
tion. However we will see later that this assumption doesn’t have any in‡uence on the results
obtained.
10For more evidence concerning the use of manager compensation based on performance
measures see Rogerson (1997)
11These private bene…ts could take many forms: the ususal perks, psychic bene…ts from
empire building, etc. Other models including Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Hart and
Moore (1998) suggests that managers can steal a large share of the cash ‡ows. Our model
is quite di¤erent since the private bene…ts are assumed to be relatively small and they are
derived from the value of the …rm (or division)
12means that outside investors cannot contract directly with division managers.
The latter hypothesis has been discussed in the literature, particularly McAfee
and McMillan (1995), assume that the top principal is unable to contract with
the agent due to limits on his time and attention. At the same time we consider
that the division manager has the possibility to take some actions in order to
improve his bargaining power versus the CEO over his compensation package.
This kind of activity is called ”Rent-seeking”: it consists of spending a part of
his time on activities that are non productive for the …rm, however it will allow
him to extract more compensation from the CEO at the time of negotiation.
It is clear here that there is no way to force the division manager to spend his
time in the right way. While there are di¤erent forms for the rent-seeking12,
we will consider here that the rent-seeking will take the form of “ resumé-
polishing”13. It consists for instance of spending time in attending industry
conventions, accepting needless speaking engagement etc...
3 ANALYSIS
We consider a model with two time periods. At time 1, the division manager
(DMi) is deriving private bene…ts of ® [¼i;1 ¡ Ci;1], while the CEO is deriving
¯
P2
i=1 [¼i;1 ¡ Ci;1];and ¼i;1, Ci;1are respectively the cash ‡ow of division i at
time 1 and the cost of capital of division i at time 1. At the end of time 1 all
the credit lines granted by the bank are paid back, all the trading positions are
o¤set and there is a new round for investment at time 2. If the DMi still in
place at time 2 he gets ® [¼i;2 ¡ Ci;2] private bene…ts. however if he leaves and
a new manager is hired by the CEO the cash ‡ow of division i falls by an amount
12Please see Schleifer and Vishny (1989) and Edlin and Stiglitz (1995) for other forms of
”rent-seeking”
13See Scharfstein and Stein (2000)
13M14. The intuition here is that during the …rst period the original manager has
acquired some speci…c knowledge and expertise which any manager outside the
…rm cannot have immediately. This speci…c knowledge can be thought of in any
number of ways: establishing a good relationship with clients, understanding
the banking culture,etc. This makes the division manager particularly valuable
for the …rm, then he will try to bargain with the CEO for higher compensation
at time2.
At time 1 the DM will anticipate his bargaining situation and would like
to take some actions in order to increase his negotiating power at time 2. As
mentioned in (2.3), one of the possibilities o¤ered to him is to do some rent-
seeking activities. By doing so he will get an outside option at time 2 denoted
by G(e); where e is the level of rent-seeking and G(.) is an increasing concave
function. In that case since the manager will not spend all his time on productive
work we expect to see the cash‡ow of his division at time 1 falling by an amount
x(e); where x(.) is an increasing convex function. Therefore if he rent-seeks he
gets ®[(1 ¡ x)¼i;1 ¡ Ci;1] private bene…ts at time 1.
Assuming that at time 1 there is a certain level of rent-seeking. Therefore
the manager has now an outside option G(e). If the division manager leaves at
time 2 he gets G(e). If he stays he gets Wi + ® [¼i;2 ¡ Ci;2]; where W is the
cash wage agreed to by the CEO. Without loss of generality we assume that
¯M > G(e), and so it is always in the interest of the CEO to retain the division
manager15. For convenience we assume that at time 2 the CEO could make a
14We assume that after one period on the division the DM has acquired some human capital
which makes him valuable for the …rm. See Stoughton and Zechner (1999)
15Suppose this assumption is not made, the problem is the same except that it will exist
a certain level of rent-seeking above which the CEO will not retain the division manager
and so there will be no extra-compensation. Since our purpose is to analyze what form the
compensation will take, it seems then interesting to make this assumption
14“take it or leave it” o¤er to the manager.
While one of our objectives in this paper is to see what form the compen-
sation package will take - cash or additional equity capital - we …rst start by
assuming that any compensation at time 2 will take only the form of cash wage
Wi which comes entirely from the CEO’s pocket. Then to formalize the situa-
tion faced by the CEO let us start from an initial situation where the capital
is allocated e¢ciently across the divisions. More explicitly we denote by k¤
i the
















If the DMi leaves at time 2 he gets G(ei), while if he stays he gets Wi +
® [¼i;2 ¡ Ci;2], so to keep the DMi in the …rm the CEO has to pay him a cash
wage Wi which satis…es the following retention constraint:
Wi + ® [¼i;2 (¾i;µi) ¡ C (¾i;k
¤
i )] ¸ G(ei) (14)
An important issue here is how the cost of capital (dividend yield) will be
chosen. For outside investors the expected total return can be viewed in term
of a dividend yield and a price appreciation or capital gains17. Said di¤erently
they set their investment allocation so as to maximize their wealth between
dividend yield to be received now and future capital gains. The problem here
is whether this allocation maximizes the bank’s value or not?
16while in this subsection we set the cash ‡ow per one unit of capital invested as independent
from the total amount invested and so
±¼i;2
±k = 0, this condition will be removed in the next
subsection.
17Because almost allbankstocks pay dividends and because banks arenot consideredgrowth
stocks, bank stocks tend to trade on a combination of relatively attractive dividend yield and
modest potential for price appreciation.
15Various papers in the literature such as Rubinstein (1978), Mossin (1972)
and Long (1972) have shown that when competition is imperfect, the value-
maximizing allocations as in a mean-variance model with homogeneous expec-
tations are not a competitive pareto-optimum. In the context of ex post analy-
sis Leland (1978) demonstrates that the unanimously-preferred production level
does not maximize the actual value of the …rm. The proof of that result essen-
tially involves implicit prices that depend on a …rm’s production. This suggests
that investors will prefer a strategy which doesn’t maximize the …rm’s value.
Given a non perfect competition, and using the mean variance model with ho-
mogeneous expectations, Barron (1979) established that value maximization for
the …rm does not result in a pareto optimal allocation, even though the value of
the …rm is maximized. That maximization leads to a less desirable pattern of
time-one return (dividend yield) than does the investment level resulting from
the competitive process. In our case this means that outside investors will re-
quire higher dividend yield levels than the level at which the …rm’s value is
maximized.
By observing inequality (14), we could say that if the DM is deriving high
private bene…ts, then he has low incentives to rent-seek, while if his private bene-
…ts are relatively small he will look for rent-seeking to increase his compensation
at time 2.
To determine the conditions under which the DMi will rent-seek, we have to
look at the sign of expression [¼i;2 ¡ Ci;2]: In fact we know that ¼i;2 = ¼ (¾i;µi)
and Ci;2 = C (¾i;ki). According to equations (2);(3);(4);(5),(7);(8);(9), we
plot a graph (see Fig.1), where we represent the dynamics of the cost and the
cash ‡ow as functions of the risk level (see appendix B for analytical proof).
It is clear from …gure1 that ¾ could not exceed ¾¤¤ otherwise the cost of
capital will be higher than the cash ‡ow level and then the project will be
16        p (si,qi); C(si,Ki)
                                                                                                 C(si,Ki)
          p2                                                                                                                            p (si,qi )
          p1
          C2
          C1
                                                           s*                 s1                s2                 s**                                       s
Figure 1:
rejected18. At the same time we have stated before that the cost of capital
represents also the dividend yield required by outside investors. The CEO as
well as the division managers would like to see the …rm’s value maximized, then
the optimal level of Ci for them will be such that :
C
¤
i 2 argmax [¼i ¡ Ci] (15)
As we stated already investors will choose a dividend yield level higher than
the level at which the …rm’s value is maximized this means that Ci ¸ C ¤
i .




@¾i. Then we have ¾ 2 [¾¤;¾¤¤] (see …g1).
Now let us back to our previous question concerning the incentives for rent-
seeking. As we have established above, the DM will rent-seek only if he is
derivinga relatively weak privatebene…ts. This means that if oneDM is deriving
less private bene…ts than his colleague, he will be more encouraged to rent-seek.
18We assume here that neither the DM nor the investor would like to invest in projects with
negative value
17The latter proposition doesn’t mean that systematically only one DM will rent-
seek. In fact both could rent-seek if their private bene…ts are too weak or both
could choose to not rent-seek if their private bene…ts are high enough.
Let us assume that division 2 is more productive than division 1- µ2 > µ1:
According to equation (5) higher productivity leads to more productive risk
taking, and so, we will have ¾2 > ¾1: As we could observe in Fig.1 for the case
where ¾2 > ¾1, we have [¼2 ¡ C2] < [¼1 ¡ C1]: Therefore DM2 is deriving less
private bene…ts than DM1, he then has more incentives to rent-seek19. It is clear
here that higher risk level would decrease the private bene…ts and then push
the DM to rent-seeking. In fact, as long as ¾ 2 [¾¤;¾¤¤], the cost of capital
is growing faster than the cash ‡ow - due to convexity of the cost function
and the concavity of the cash ‡ow function. Consequently the decision of rent-
seeking will be strongly related to the risk level of the division. This contrasts
other papers like, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales
(1998) which stated that rent-seeking strategy is much more a matter of division
productivity ( low productive division will see their DM more likely to rent-
seek):Indeed the previous results hold even if µ1 < µ2, since equation (5), states
that higher productivity leads to more risk taking.
This situation is widely observed inside banks, particularly in the trading
area. Indeed traders with high productivity - consequence of their high ability to
make money- are allowed to take more risky positions in the markets relatively
to “less skilled traders”20. To understand more clearly how this process works,
let’s analyze the way, how the risk level and the cost of capital are established.
We start, by assuming that investors observe the risk on the market and then
19Of course here we assume that the di¤erence in private bene…ts is enough wide to push
the DM to rent-seek. This also means that the di¤erence in risk level is also large.
20Banks usually set position limits for each trader- limits in term of amount invested as well
as in trems of risk level i.e: VAR limits.
18set their dividend yield target ( cost of capital). Now someone could ask why
the DM do not increase the risk level of his division and so its expected cash
‡ow? Since we consider a situation of a perfect symmetric information ( risk
levels are observed by the CEO, DM and outside investors), any change in the
risk level by the DM, will be observed by the investor who will instantaneously
adjust his return target by increasing the cost of capital. Since the marginal
cost of capital is higher than the marginal cash ‡ow ( we have ¾ 2 [¾¤;¾ ¤¤]),
then any increase in the risk level will decrease the quantity [¼i ¡ Ci] , and by
so the private bene…ts of DMi. Consequently it’s not in the interest of the DM
to increase the risk level.
Now let’s back to our initial problem. We said that if DMi rent-seeks he gets
an outside option of G(ei). At the same time his private bene…ts at time 1 falls
by ®x(ei) ¼i;1: Therefore if G(ei) ¸ ®x(ei)¼i;1;the CEO has to compensate the
DMi with a cash wage Wi equal to G(ei) ¡ ®x(ei)¼i;1.
Then for a given level of rent-seeking ei the DM will rent-seek only if
® [¼i;2 ¡ Ci;2 (¾i;k
¤
i ) + x (ei)¼i;1] ¸ G (ei) (16)
If there is a certain level of rent-seeking ei that satis…es (16), then there will
be some rent-seeking at equilibrium denoted by e¤
i:It is determined by equating
the marginal loss in time 1 private bene…ts and the marginal gain in time 2
compensation. Therefore if at the level of e¤
i the condition in (16) is not satis…ed,
then there will be no rent-seeking. The main consequence of this analysis is that
managers of riskier divisions ( higher productive ones) have more incentives to
rent-seek (see appendix B).
We could distinguish basically two regions for the risk level inside the interval
[¾¤;¾¤¤]. First if ¾ is higher than some cuto¤ ¾± the rent-seeking condition is
19satis…ed, so managers will rent-seek. In this region the level of rent-seeking
increases as ¾ increases. In the second region if ¾ < ¾± managers do not rent-
seek at all; the rent seeking condition (16) is not satis…ed. Indeed at these lower
levels of risk the loss of private bene…ts for both managers are so high that they
prefer to not rent-seek (see appendix C).
Consequently managers of higher productive divisions are given higher wages
than those of low productive divisions. Since these managers are more encour-
aged to rent-seek so the CEO is compelled to give them higher compensation to
get them to stay- recall here we did not introduced yet the possibility of com-
pensating the DM through extra capital allocation. This scenario is quite close
to what we usually see in practice, in fact DM of higher productive divisions
get higher compensation packages.
At this stage let’s summarize our conclusions in proposition 1:
Proposition 1 Division managers of risky (high productive) divisions have
more incentives to rent-seek than their colleagues of lower risky (low productive)
divisions. To avoid that, the CEO has to give them extra-compensation so that
the retention constraint is binding.
Our conclusions for this section are contrasting those claimed by Scharfstein
and Stein(2000) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (1997) where managers of low
productive divisions are “ overcompensated” relatively to their colleagues of
stronger divisions. In fact the last argument has been advanced as one reason for
ine¢ciency inside internal capital markets. While at this stage of the analysis we
established that there is no “socialism”in the conglomerate form of organization,
It doesn’t mean that internal capital markets are e¢cient. In fact we simply
claim that if there is ine¢ciency it is not due to any form of socialism inside
the …rm. Now it is compulsory to go deeper in the analysis and examine the
20situation where the compensation could take the form of cash wage or additional
equity capital.
3.1 What Form Of Compensation the CEO will choose?
In the following we consider the same problem as previously, except that we allow
the CEO to choose between two forms of compensation : cash wage or additional
capital equity. As we saw already, DM of riskier divisions is more likely to engage
some rent-seeking activities in order to increase his compensation. To prevent
such a behavior the CEO has to give him extra-compensation. What we will
try to analyze in this section is the form of compensation the CEO will choose.
We start by de…ning the objective function of the CEO:
Max ¯[¼ 1;2 (¾1;µ1)¡C1;2 (¾ 1;k1)+¼2;2 (¾2;µ2)¡C2;2 (¾2;k2)]¡W (17)
Where W represents the total wage budget given by outside investors to the
CEO and we assume that it is large enough to compensate both managers21.
At this stage someone could ask to which extend investors could force the CEO
to use the wage budget for compensating the division managers and not using it
for himself. This issue was widely discussed in the literature and many authors
agreed that, while investors could set some constraints on the use of the wage
budget when they hire the CEO, it seems however very di¢cult from a practical
point view for them to dictate him the way how to spend the cash wage22. In
my point view, such a question is useless in our case, since it does not solve the
problem of optimality for both investors and CEO. Indeed it is more important
21As you could notice we did not specify any constraint on the way how the wage budget
is spent. This means that we do not care whether or not, the investor set a minimum portion
of the wage budget to be given to managers.
22For more discussions of this point see Sharfstein and Stein (1998)
21to analyze the consequence of the use of wage budget rather than checking to
which party this wage goes. Said di¤erently, we have to ask ourselves whether
the use of the cash wage budget leads to higher e¢ciency or not?
To answer the above question let us start by considering the problem faced
by both, division manager and the CEO. According to (14) the CEO is facing
the following retention constraint:
Wi + ® [¼i;2 (¾i;µi) ¡ C (¾i;k¤
i )] ¸ G (ei)
Since here we allow the CEO to allocate additional capital as a form of
compensation, it is compulsory to modify shortly the cash ‡ow function so as to
depend also on the amount of capital invested in the division23. In the previous
case it wasn’t necessary to do so since, the only way of compensation was the
cash wage. Then we could write that ¼i = ¼ (¾i;µi;ki) with ki the amount
invested in division i. Therefore the retention constraint becomes :
Wi + ®[¼i;2 (¾i;µi;ki) ¡ Ci;2 (¾i;ki)] ¸ G(ei) (18)
It is clear here that we allow ki to di¤er from k¤
i(see equation (16)):
In order to retain DMi, the CEO has to provide extra-compensation. If he
chooses to compensate him with an extra-cash wage so that (18) is satis…ed,
the CEO will see his objective function under the optimal level - due to the
negative sign of W. From the investors point view such a decision will not a¤ect
the value of the …rm since the cash wage will come entirely from the “pocket”
of the CEO, while for the CEO such a solution will a¤ect his objective function.
23In our context of imperfect competition and incomplete markets, the cash ‡ow which
represents also the return per one unit of capital invested will depend also on the level of
investment.
22If he chooses to compensate the DM through additional capital, he will also see
his objective function a¤ected. Now the issue is to …nd which is better for the
CEO cash wage or capital equity?
As we stated before the cash ‡ow function depends on k, and it represents
the amount of cash ‡ow generated by one unit of capital invested. As we did in
(9), we show that ¼i;2 (¾ i;µi;ki) is an increasing and monotonous function of k.
Consequently ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;ki) could take three forms: concave convex or linear.
In appendix D, we show that for the cases where ¼i;2 is convex or linear, there
exists a unique level k± 6= 0 at which ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k±) = Ci;2 (¾i;k±): And for,
k < k± ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k±) < Ci;2 (¾i;k±)
k > k
± ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k
±) > Ci;2 (¾i;k
±)
However for the case where ¼i;2 is concave, things are less obvious, since ¼i;2
and Ci;2 are both increasing and concave functions, it is possible that ¼i;2 ¡
Ci;2 6= 0 for every k6= 0. In order to understand the way how the cash ‡ow will
vary with the amount of capital invested, let’s assume for instance that the
bank’s credit lending division will invest its capital in a portfolio of loans. The
cash ‡ow generated by one unit of capital will be an increasing concave function
of k. At the same time we assume that an outside investor has the possibility to
invest directly in the same portfolio rather than investing in the bank’s capital.
However this possibility will incur some monitoring costs which increases with k.
While in this paper we assumed a perfect symmetric information and so there is
no scale of economies in information production, these costs could be generated
by the lack of knowledge and experience in managing loan portfolios24.
Someone could ask here, why outside investor invests directly in the portfolio
24This concept is widely discussed in the litterature concerning the bene…ts of intermedia-
tion. See Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), Diamond (1991) and Krasa and Villamil (1992).
23if he will support some monitoring costs. We explain this by the fact that
he derives a certain utility U(k) from managing his own money. Then for 2
equivalent expected returns he will prefer to invest directly in the loan portfolio.
We denote by CM(k), the cost of monitoring supported by outside investor
for one unit of capital invested directly in the loan portfolio. Then his utility in
this case will be:
U(k) = Rp ¡ CM(k) + U(k) (19)
where Rp is the return of the loan portfolio for one unit of investment, and
U(k) is the total utility per one unit of capital invested directly in the portfolio.
Since the bank’s division does not support any monitoring costs, its cash ‡ow
function will be equal to the return of the portfolio: ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;ki) = Rp(ki): If
we observe (19) we see that, for a level of k close to zero the total utility from
investing directly in the portfolio will be higher than Rp. Since we know that
±CM (k)
±K > 0, then for a certain level of k=k± we will have CM(k) = ~ U and so:
U(k
±) = Rp(k
±) = ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k
±)
At this levelthe required return by outside investor will be equal to Ci;2 (¾i;k±) =
U(k±) = ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k±) : Consequently for the case where ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;ki) is con-
cave, there exists a unique level k± 6= 0 at which
¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k±) = Ci;2 (¾i;k±):
Therefore we showed that if ¼ i;2 (¾i;µi;k±) is an increasing and monotonous
function of k, there exists a unique level of capital k± such that ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k±) =
Ci;2 (¾i;k±). If k < k±; we have ¼ i;2 (¾i;µi;k±) < Ci;2 (¾i;k±) ; while for k >
k± we have ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k±) > Ci;2 (¾i;k±):
24p(s,q,K)
 C (s,K)
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Figure 2:
For more illustration we proceed as for the previous case and we plot a
graph (Fig.2), where we represent both the cost of the capital and the cash ‡ow
functions. Here we consider the case where ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k±) is concave. As we
stressed already the same results hold for both cases of linearity and convexity25.
We have ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k±) = Ci;2 (¾i;k±) : As you could see in Fig 2, as long as
K is below K± we have ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;ki)¡Ci;2 (¾i;ki) ￿ 0. Therefore if the capital
allocated to the division is below K±, this will lead to lower private bene…ts
for both the DM and the CEO, due to the fact that the cost of capital will be
higher than the cash ‡ow generated. It seems then more interesting here to
compensate the DM with cash rather than additional capital, since in the latter
case the retention constraint will not be satis…ed.
If the amount of equity capital allocated to DM is higher than K±, both CEO
and division manager will see their private bene…ts increasing, due to the fact
that the cash ‡ow generated is higher than the cost of capital. Consequently it
25See appendix for analytical proof.
25seems more interesting in this case for the CEO to compensate division manager
with additional amount of capital as long as this amount is higher than K±. The
latter conclusion implies that if the rent-seeking is enough strong, there is a high
probability to see extra-compensation taking the form of equity capital. This
also means that the CEO will always prefer to compensate the DM with cash
wage as long as the amount of capital necessary to satisfy (18) is not large. We
summarize the results established at this stage in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 we denote by ¾i and ¾j respectively the risk measures of divi-
sions i and j ; we have ¾0 2 [¾¤;¾¤¤] which is the cuto¤ for which the rent-seeking
condition is satis…ed. We distinguish essentially three cases :
Case n±1 : ¾i and ¾ j are both below ¾0. In this case the rent-seeking condi-
tion (16) for both division managers is not satis…ed, consequently none of them
would like to rent-seek.
Case n±2 : ¾i > ¾0 and ¾j < ¾ 0: Here DMi will rent-seek while DMj will
not do so. If the rent seeking level is high then we will see an additional capital
allocation towards division i. While if the level of rent-seeking is low, no extra-
capital allocation will be observed, however we will see more cash wage granted
to division i.
Case n±3 : ¾i > ¾0 and ¾j> ¾0; both division managers will rent-seek. If
the level of rent-seeking is high for both, then we will see more capital allocated
to both divisions. If the rent-seeking is not so strong, then no additional capital
will be allocated, however we will see additional cash wage for both divisions.
Finally if the rent-seeking is high for one division and low for the other one,
we will see additional capital for the division of high rent-seeking and more cash
wage for the division with low rent-seeking.
As a conclusion for this section we could say that the rent-seeking behavior
is strongly related to the level of risk inside the division. Indeed if the division
26is enough risky (¾ > ¾0), its division manager will have more incentives to
rent-seek than his colleague of a lower risky division. Again we stress on the
possibility that both managers could rent-seek at the same time, as well as
both of them could choose to not rent-seek. Since we stated in our hypothesis
that higher productivity leads to higher risk taking (eq(5)), we could extend
our results to say that division managers of higher productive divisions have
more incentives to rent-seek than their colleagues of lower productive divisions.
These conclusions contrast those claimed by Scharfstein and Stein(1998), where
rent-seeking is much more the behavior of managers of low productive divisions.
At the same time we showed that when the CEO has the choice between
compensating division managers with cash wage or additional equity capital, it
will be more optimal for him to do that with cash as long as the amount of capital
necessary to satisfy the retention constraint of the DM is low (K<K±). By the
opposite when the amount of capital requested to satisfy (18) is large (K>K±), it
is more optimal for the CEO to compensate the division manager with additional
equity capital. We stress here on the fact that allocating additional equity
capital to one division doesn’t mean necessarily that the other one will get
less. Indeed by contrast with other models where the capital budget is …xed at
the beginning, this model doesn’t set any constraints on the amount of capital
invested since every additional unit of capital involves higher costs for the …rm26.
In this case, the question of whether outside investors will continue to inject
money in the …rm ”inde…nitely” or not? seems to be of low interest, since the
required return is systematically adjusted respectively to both risk level and the
amount of capital invested. So as long as the …rm pays the required cost of
capital, no apparent reason could push investors to not invest.
26For models where there is a …xed capital amount see Rajan and Zingales (1997)
274 Empirical implications and related papers
In this section we show the relevance of our results for the understanding of ob-
served capital budgeting procedures. Empirically we expect to see the following
results:
1. High risky divisions are allocated relatively more capital than lower risky
divisions. For instance we expect to see the trading division (high risky) getting
more resources than the retail division (less risky).
2. Bigger divisions are more risky than smaller ones. This comes from the
fact that bigger divisions will normally require high amounts of capital27.
3. If the amount of capital requested is high, there is a strong probability for
its acceptance by the CEO and the Top management28. Consequently we expect
to see divisions with high investment opportunities -and so higher requests-
allocated more capital than divisions with lower investment opportunities29.
4. If the division is not requesting high amounts of capital, we will probably
see its cash wage budget higher than those of higher capital requests. This
means that the cash wage amount allocated to divisions with lower investment
opportunities is relatively high to those with high investment opportunities.
5. There is a negative correlation between the amount of capital allocated
and the cash wage budget : the more capital a division has, the less cash wage
it will get.
27In our case we assumed a perfect symmetric information, then the division manager could
not lie on the amount of capital he needs.
28While in this paper we assumed that the capital allocation decision is entirely in CEO’s
hand, in reality the situation is quite di¤erent. Indeed di¤erent parties could decide for the
amount of capital allocated.
29Empirically we use the Tobin’s q measure as a proxies for investment opportunities. See
Shin and Stulz (1997) and Rajan, Raghuram G.; Servaes and Zingales (1997)
28Our conclusions are strongly in line with those established by Harris and
Raviv (1996). Indeed these authors showed that there is a positive correlation
between the amount of capital requested and the approval probability. At the
same time they claimed that divisions with high audit costs and high investment
opportunities are allocated less managerial salary. Finally they expect to see
monopolistic divisions with high investment opportunities having high approval
probabilities for additional request. While the context of analysis in Harris and
Raviv (1996) is quite di¤erent30, it is clear that our results are basically in the
same direction as those claimed by these authors.
If we extend these results -particularly 1 and 2- to the context of a …nan-
cial system, we could suggest that bigger banks are more likely to be riskier
than smaller ones. This means that the bigger the bank is the more risky it
will be. This idea could partly explain why the wave of merger and acquisi-
tions observed in banking industry leads to higher systemic risk31. In fact there
is almost a general consensus in the …nancial community that the presence of
larger institutions presents a danger to the safety and soundness of the …nancial
system, because it can directly imposes losses on other institutions and also
creates doubts about the health of other institutions. According to Mishkin
(1999), the concerns about the contagion from the failure of a large institution
is one reason why governments and regulators are reluctant to let large institu-
tions fail32. Indeed, with a greater number of large institutions resulting from
…nancial consolidation, the pressures to follow a too-big- to- fail policy, in which
depositors and other creditors are fully protected against any losses, increases.
For instance, if depositors and creditors of large …nancial institutions know that
they are likely to be completely protected if the institutions fails, they have even
30they do not consider a case of a …nancial …rm. No cost of capital and no risk measure is
considered.
31See Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999)
32The case of Long Term Capital Management fund is one example.
29less incentive to monitor the institution and pull out their funds when it takes
on too much risk. Because of this lack of monitoring, large institutions might
take on even greater risks than they otherwise would.
Some static analysis as Berger and Udell (1995), Berger and Udell (1996)
and Peek and Rosenberg (1996) have shown that large banking organizations
devote lesser proportions of their assets to small business loans than do small
organizations. These conclusions are quite in line with our results particularly
the idea that the bigger the bank (division) is the more risky it is - we assume
that small business projects are less risky than bigger ones. Others like Santos
(1997), Keeton (1996) and Berger and Udell (1998) established that consolida-
tion of large banking organizations tend to reduce small business lending. This
is also in line with result 4.
Our results …nds also a strong empirical support in Shin and Stulz (1997).
These authors …nd that internal capital market allocate more resources to seg-
ment that have better investment opportunities, however there is no evidence
that investment budgets of a segment with better investment opportunities are
protected when the …rm experiences an adverse cash ‡ow shock.
According to the de…nition of internal capital market’s e¢ciency stated in
the introduction, we could say that our results satisfy two conditions: Indeed
we showed that more capital is allocated to divisions with better investments
opportunities. While divisions with poor investment opportunities has low prob-
ability of approval when they request capital. However we do not know if the
investment budget of high productive division is protected when the …rm expe-
riences a sudden big decrease in its global cash ‡ow. Our answer here is that
it will depend on the degree of interaction between di¤erent divisions and the
risk correlation between di¤erent activities. If for instance a sudden change in
the yield curve shape a¤ects the value of the trading Bond’s portfolio, there is a
30high probability to see the credit lending activity a¤ected too. This conclusion
has an empirical evidence in Shin and Stulz (1997).
Despite the fact that some empirical papers support the idea that there is
a type of socialism inside internal capital markets and by so they explain why
conglomerates are priced down by the stock market, we should however look
at theses results very carefully. In fact many papers exclude from their set of
data the banking industry and so their results could not be applicable in our
context. For instance Lamont and Polk (1999) as well as Berger and Ofek (1995)
discarded …rms with segments in the …nancial services industry.
While our conclusions plays in favor of a conglomerate form of organization,
we should stress that our analysis is typically for the banking industry. Indeed
our results are obtained partly through the assumption set on the cash ‡ow
function. In fact for a non …nancial …rm, it would be hard to say that the
cash ‡ow is a continuous, increasing and concave function of the amount of
capital invested. This is partly due to the scale economies inside a non …nancial
industry33.
In our analysis we assumed not only a perfect symmetric information inside
and outside the …rm but also a zero risk correlation. This means that the
division’s investment decision is totally independent from the investment level
of another division. In reality however we are more likely to see, interactions
between di¤erent divisions and so between di¤erent types of risks. This plays
in a favor of a centralized budgeting process inside banks34.
33Fixed costs are assumed to be relatively high in a non …nancial industry by comparaison
with the banking industry ex: Mining industry
34see Froot and Stein (1998)
315 Conclusion
In this article we tried to …ll partially one lack in the literature by building
a capital budgeting model which integrates both agency problems and costly
capital, and where the interests of outside investors diverge with those of the
CEO and the division managers. We showed that an optimal capital budget-
ing process in this context exhibits many characteristics of the actual allocation
schemes. We established in particular that bigger divisions are more likely to be
the riskier ones. In the same time we didn’t found any form of socialism inside
…nancial conglomerates, since we established that bigger divisions with higher
capital request will be allocated more resources than smaller divisions. We also
found a negative correlation between the wage budget granted to one division
and its capital allocation. This means that divisions with smaller investments
opportunities will have less capital but higher wages relatively to divisions with
high investment opportunities. Although our results were established in a the-
oretical context, they have however a strong implications particularly in the
…nancial system. Indeed we found that consolidation in the banking industry
could lead to higher systemic risk. This conclusion is widely claimed in the
literature.
Despite the consistency and the empirical evidence of our results some limits
persist however. Particularly the assumption of perfect symmetric information
and the absence of interaction between di¤erent divisions. Indeed we expect
to see some di¤erences in the results if the risk was non observable by outside
investors. It could be very interesting to analyze the same model in the context
of asymmetric information and where divisional risks are correlated. Although
these limits, we think that this paper took a step towards reconciling the bud-
geting theory and actual practice.
32Appendix A.
The bank is assumed to invest in an equity portfolio ( buy some shares issued
by one …rm in the market).
We denote by A(t) the value of the …rm’s assets at time t, F the face value
of a zero-coupon debt issued by the …rm and maturing at date T and D(t,T) the
market value of the …rm’s debt at time t . We assume that the debt is bought
by a third part outside the bank35. Let S(t) denote the market value of equity





A(T) ¡ F ; A(T) ¸ F




Following Merton (1974), it is assumed that
dA(t)
A(t)
= ¹ dt + ¾ dB(t)
where ¹ is the instantaneous expected rate of return; ¾ the volatility and
B(t) is a Brownian motion. It assumed that ¹ and ¾ are constant implying that
A(t) is lognormally distributed. Hence we can write







Where B(t) is normally distributed with zero mean and variance t.
Assuming that the default free rate of interest is deterministic over the period
of [0;T] and using the results in Merton (1974), we have:
35It could be another bank or another …rm.
33S(t) = c[A(t);T;F;¾] (A2)
where c[A(t);T;F;¾] is the value of a European call option described by:













d2 = d1 ¡ ¾
p
T ¡ t
B(t;T) = the value of a treasury bill at time t that pays 1$
for sure at date T.
Since ¼ is the expected net cash ‡ow per one unit of investment, it then
represents the expected return on investment. For our example if we denote by
I0 the amount of capital invested by the bank in the equity portfolio, then we
will have:



























































1 < 0 (A4:2)
Consequently the cash‡ow per one unit of capital invested is an increasing
concave function of the risk level.
Appendix B.
¼i = ¼ (¾i;µi) with
@¼i





Ci = C (¾i;ki) with @ Ci




we denote by F(¾) = [¼i;2 (¾i;µi) ¡ Ci;2 (¾i;ki)]















Therefore F is a concave function and it admits a maximum. We denote by
¾¤ the risk level at which F(¾) is maximized. ¾¤ is obtained by setting the …rst









We denote by ¾¤¤ the risk level at which F(¾¤¤) = 0.
we know that F(0)=0 since ¼i;2 (0;µi) = Ci;2 (0;ki) = 0: This assumes that
there is always a risk level associated to any investment, and so if the risk is
zero this also means that there is no investment.
we assumed that any project chosen by the manager must have a positive
value (F(¾) > 0); otherwise it will be rejected.
¼i;2 (¾i;µi) and Ci;2 (¾i;ki) are both monotone, then F is also monotone


















F(0)=0 and F(¾¤¤) = 0, we know also that F is strictly positive and mono-
tone and it admits a maximum at ¾¤
) F is a strictly decreasing function for every ¾ 2 [¾¤;¾¤¤].
Therefore for every ¾i and ¾j such that ¾¤ < ¾j < ¾i < ¾¤¤, we have :
F(¾i) = [¼i;2 (¾i;µi) ¡ Ci;2 (¾i;ki)] < F(¾j) = [¼j;2 (¾j;µj) ¡ Cj;2 (¾j;kj)]:
Then if division i is riskier than division j, the DMi has less private bene…ts
than his colleague DMj: Therefore he has more incentives to rent-seek.
36Appendix C.
Accordingto(16), for a given levelof rent-seeking ei the DMi will rent-seek
only if
® [¼i;2 ¡ Ci;2 (¾i;k¤
i ) + x (ei)¼i;1] ¸ G (ei)









±ei . Therefore at e¤
i the constraint (16) is binding. For this level
of rent-seeking corresponds a risk level ¾± 2 [¾¤;¾¤¤] such that
® [¼i;2(¾±;µi) ¡ Ci;2 (¾ ±;k¤
i ) + x (e¤
i)¼i;1] = G (e¤
i)
Since we established (appendix A) that F(¾i) = [¼i;2 (¾ i;µi) ¡ Ci;2 (¾i;ki)]
is a decreasing function of ¾ for every ¾ 2 [¾¤;¾¤¤], then for every ¾ below ¾ ±
we have F(¾) >F(¾±); and so:
®[¼i;2 ¡ Ci;2 (¾±;k¤
i ) + x (e¤
i) ¼i;1] < ®[¼i;2 ¡ Ci;2 (¾;k¤
i) + x (e¤
i)¼ i;1] (A7)
(A7) means also that for ¾ < ¾± we have:
® [¼i;2(¾;µi) ¡ Ci;2 (¾;k¤
i ) + x (e¤
i) ¼i;1] > G (e¤
i)
and so the rent-seeking condition is not satis…ed, then the division manager
will not rent-seek.
In the same way, we show that for ¾ > ¾±
37® [¼i;2(¾;µi) ¡ Ci;2 (¾;k¤
i ) + x (e¤
i) ¼i;1] < G (e¤
i)
Therefore the rent-seeking condition is satis…ed and so the division manager
will rent-seeks.
Appendix D.
1±/ In the following we consider the case where ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;ki) is an increasing
convex function of k. We will show that there exist a unique level of capital







±k2 > 0 (A8)
So ¼i;2 is an increasing, monotonous and convex function of k. On the other






±k2 < 0 (A9)
So Ci;2 is an increasing, monotonous and concave function of k. On the
other hand we know that ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;0) = Ci;2 (¾i;0) = 0: According to (A8)
and (A9), there exists ka and k± both unique and di¤erent from zero such that:


















for k > ka (A11)


















Therefore F(k) is a convex function and it admits a minimum at ka: Accord-
ing to (A10) and (A11) for 0< k<ka; F is a decreasing function of k, while for
k>ka F is an increasing function of k. Since we know that F(k±)=0 and F(0)=0
then k± > ka and F(ka) is strictly negative. Consequently when ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;ki)
is convex, there exists k± 6= 0 such that ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k±) = Ci;2 (¾ i;k±) and we
have:
¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k) ¡ Ci;2 (¾i;k) < 0 for k < k± (A12)
¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k) ¡ Ci;2 (¾i;k) > 0 for k > k
± (A13)
2±/ For the case where ¼i;2 (¾i;µi;k) is linear we use exactly the same idea
as for the previous case to show the existence of k± and we …nd also the same
result as for (A12) and (A13).
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